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ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE, INTEGRATED REPORTING, AND 
THE ACCURACY OF ANALYST FORECASTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The International Integrated Reporting Council advocates that integrated reporting (IR) 
should become the worldwide norm for corporate reporting aimed at serving the needs of 
investors.  Nonetheless, only in South Africa has IR been mandated.  We study the impact of 
the reporting regime change in South Africa on analyst forecast accuracy over the period 
2008 to 2012, as a way of evaluating users’ perceptions of the usefulness of IR.  We theorise 
that any effects of IR will be greater the greater is the level of disclosures of environmental, 
social and governance performance.  We find results consistent with those who support IR 
and our theory that the level of environmental, social and governance disclosures is a 
mediating variable in determining the effectiveness of IR.  The results are driven by the levels 
of environmental disclosure and, to a lesser extent, governance disclosure.  Our results 
provide some support for those who advocate the virtues of integrated reporting.          
    
Key words: integrated reporting; environmental, social and governance disclosures; analyst 
forecasts 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that corporations have responsibilities to not only their shareholders but also to 
society overall has been around for centuries (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). In this context, a 
criticism of financial reporting is that it does not adequately satisfy the informational needs of 
all stakeholders who wish to assess a company’s past and future performance.  This is   
because it only provides a partial account of business activities, ignoring the social and 
environmental impact made by an entity (Flower, 2015).  As a consequence, there have been 
calls for enhanced reporting on corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as for any 
additional information that can potentially impact on business performance.  Subsequently, 
the number of companies disclosing their initiatives and performance with respect to 
environmental and social activities has grown.  The preferred format for such disclosures has 
typically been a stand-alone report.
1
   
 
A concern with stand-alone reports related to environmental and social activities is that they 
provide non-financial information which is non-integrated and compartmentalised.  
Therefore, they are not capable of providing stakeholders with the required links and 
connections that are fundamental to effectively evaluating business performance, strategy and 
potential for future value creation (Wild and van Staden, 2013, p.6).  Integrated Reporting 
(IR) is seen as a response to this criticism.  The International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC) states that the purpose of IR is to provide ‘... information about an organisation’s 
strategy, governance, performance and prospects in a way that reflects the commercial, social 
and environmental context within which it operates’ (IIRC, 2011, p.2).  The IIRC has 
                                                          
1  We use the term ‘stand-alone report’ to describe a number of differently titled reports. These titles include 
‘Sustainability Report’, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Report’, ‘Sustainable Development Report’ and 
‘Triple Bottom Line Report’.  The common characteristic of these reports is a focus on the environment 
and/or society. 
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established a network of companies experimenting with IR.  Further, the IIRC advocates that 
IR should become the worldwide norm for corporate reporting to investors.   
 
Research on the usefulness of IR is relatively sparse and impeded by two factors.  First, only 
in South Africa has IR been mandated, with South African listed firms with financial years 
ending after February 28, 2011 required to publish an integrated report on an ‘apply or 
explain’ basis.  As a consequence, the study of IR in other jurisdictions involves firms that 
adopt IR voluntarily.  Second, as Pope and McLeay (2011) point out, the study of firms that 
voluntarily adopt particular reporting practices does not necessarily produce results that are 
generalisable to all companies.  This is because the firms studied could have reason to adopt 
the practices other than for reasons of good citizenship and a belief in transparency. 
Consequently, adopting firms might be different from non-adopting firms in ways that bias 
the results of tests of usefulness.  Second, the number of firms voluntarily adopting IR around 
the world is relatively small.   
 
Given these arguments, studying South African firms has interest.  Our analysis investigates 
South African firms covering the period 2008-2012.  Therefore, we cover firms which are 
mandated to implement IR on an ‘apply or explain’ basis in the later part of the period 
investigated.  We study the impact of the reporting regime change on analyst forecast 
accuracy as a way of evaluating investors’ perceptions of the usefulness of IR.  In particular, 
we study whether the implementation of IR in South Africa is associated with a change in the 
relationship between levels of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures and 
analyst forecast accuracy, consistent with IR providing useful information to financial report 
users.   
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Three key assumptions underpin our research approach.  First, we assume that a link between 
ESG-related disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy will only exist if there is a link 
between ESG performance and future financial performance for South African listed 
companies.
2
   This appears to be an argument with which the promoters of IR in South Africa 
agree, and is crucial in attempting to make any case for IR providing useful information about 
the financial implications of ESG performance to capital markets users.  The second 
assumption is that, if the claims of supporters of IR are valid, and that linking ESG 
performance with future financial performance through an integrated report provides 
stakeholders with an improved understanding of the firm and its future, we expect analyst 
forecast accuracy to improve after the implementation of IR.
3
  The third assumption is that 
any effects of IR will be greater the greater is the level of ESG disclosures.  Therefore, an 
implied assumption is that ESG is a mediating variable in determining the effectiveness of 
IR.  Put another way, the integrated reports of firms which do not disclose much on ESG 
performance are unlikely to enhance the understanding of the linkages between ESG 
performance and financial performance, or provide a holistic view of the firms activities, 
much differently from conventional financial statements.  Under these circumstances, we 
would not expect to see much change in forecast accuracy for such firms. 
 
We note, however, that there were no well accepted guidelines on what constitutes an 
integrated report in South Africa for the period we study, with the exception of a brief 
Discussion Paper entitled ‘Framework for Integrated Reporting and the Integrated Report’ 
                                                          
2
  Any links are likely to be complex.  For example, they might relate to factors affecting revenue streams, 
such as the degree of consumer activism faced by the firm, its competitive position, and the markets 
served.  They might also relate to its cost structure, including regulatory interventions, clean-up costs 
associated with pollution and other environmental damage, and labour market outcomes.  
3
  If it is argued that the low take-up of integrated reporting on a voluntary basis around the world referred to 
above reflects firms rationally choosing the optimal forms of disclosure, whether mandated or not, with 
regards to the informational needs of stock market participants, then we would not expect to see the 
mandating of IR having any positive effect on analyst forecast accuracy.    
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issued in early 2011 by the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) of South Africa.  How 
effective the implementation of IR is in South Africa is an empirical question, therefore.  This 
also implies that tests on the usefulness of IR in South Africa are joint tests of the usefulness 
of the underlying concept of IR and the effectiveness of the application of the concept.
4
 
 
Our work can be related to two prior papers which either challenge the assumptions 
underlying our work, or complement our study.  The results and theorising in Dhaliwal, 
Radhakrishnan, Tsang and Yang (2012) challenge the assumptions underlying our research.  
As part of an international study, they provide results on whether publishing a standalone 
CSR report improves analyst forecast accuracy in South Africa.  They investigate an earlier 
period than we do (i.e., prior to the mandating of IR in South Africa).   
 
A crucial part of their argument is that a link between ESG performance and future financial 
performance is only likely to be found for firms in stakeholder–oriented, not shareholder-
oriented, economies. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) identify South Africa as a shareholder-oriented 
economy and, hence, do not expect the publication of a standalone CSR report to improve 
analyst forecast accuracy in South Africa.   
 
                                                          
4
  South Africa later adopted the more detailed IIRC IR guidelines issued in 2013 (IIRC, 2013).  The IIRC 
guidelines adopt a shareholder focus, a focus that is subject to debate in academic circles (see Adams, 
2015; Flower, 2015; Thomson, 2015).  Therefore, the period we study is one where firms were not 
expected to adopt an explicit investor focus in preparing integrated reports.  If this implies that the 
integrated reports are less useful to analysts, our tests are less likely to find any impact of IR on the 
relationship between ESG disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy.  If we do find results suggesting 
that there is an impact, such results provide evidence that an investor focus in IR is not necessary for the 
resulting integrated reports to be relevant to investors.  Further, these guidelines suggest that firms should 
concentrate on material links between aspects of ESG and financial performance in their integrated 
reports. This suggestion is consistent with the idea that underlying business models differ across firms and 
that firms have different key aspects of ESG performance that they need to manage.  As a consequence, it 
is not clear which, if any, aspects of ESG disclosures will be linked to forecast accuracy.  Therefore, we 
investigate the links between three different components of ESG disclosures (environmental, social, and 
governance) and forecast accuracy. 
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Consistent with their argument, they find no association between the existence of a 
standalone CSR report and analyst forecast accuracy in South Africa.  More generally, they 
find that a relationship between the publication of a standalone CSR report and improved 
forecast accuracy is found more in stakeholder-oriented countries.  As a consequence, and 
notwithstanding the views of the promoters of IR in South Africa and elsewhere, it is not 
clear whether the assumption of a link between ESG performance and future financial 
performance is justified and, therefore, it is also not clear that IR will improve analyst 
forecast accuracy in South Africa.   
 
Two points can be made here.  First, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) do not evaluate the quality of the 
standalone CSR reports in South Africa, or in any of the countries they study, merely their 
existence.  Therefore, one explanation of their results that cannot be ruled out is that the 
quality of the CSR standalone reports in South Africa in communicating relevant information 
to capital markets was poor over the period they study and, as a consequence, it is this that 
explains their results, not any shareholder orientation of the South African economy.  Second, 
it is possible that, although the South African economy during their study period was 
primarily shareholder-oriented, the various South African King reports have produced a move 
towards a more stakeholder-oriented economy.
5
  If such is the case, it is not clear that results 
from periods prior to the one studied here will generalise to subsequent periods.      
 
In complementary work, Zhou, Simnett and Green (forthcoming) study the degree of 
integration of the financial reports of South African firms and its effect on analyst forecast 
accuracy.  Using a sample of South African firm-years from 2009 to 2012, they first develop 
a measure which captures the extent to which the firms’ reports are integrated in line with the 
                                                          
5
  See, for example, Angelopoulos, Parnell and Scott (2013) and Muswaka (2013) for discussions of this 
possibility. 
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IIRC framework for IR (IIRC, 2013).  They find evidence suggesting that the higher the 
degree of integration of the reports, the better the accuracy of analyst forecast errors, 
consistent with the idea of integrated reporting providing useful information to capital market 
participants.
6
   
 
Our work differs from theirs in the following key respects.
7
  Whereas they study the effects 
of the degree of integration of reports across their whole study period, irrespective of whether 
IR is or is not mandated, they do not explicitly study the effects of the level of disclosure of 
any underlying ESG material.  Essentially, they study whether the IIRC framework is 
effective in defining the characteristics of good integrated reporting, applied to the South 
African context.  In contrast, we focus on the disclosure levels of the base ESG material that 
arguably provides some of the input of non-financial information that needs to be integrated 
via IR.  Then, we consider how the relationship between ESG disclosure levels and analyst 
forecast accuracy changes with the mandating of IR.  This approach also allows us to look at 
separate aspects of ESG disclosure and how their relationships with forecast accuracy change 
with the mandating of IR.  Nonetheless, we do not focus explicitly on the differing degrees of 
effectiveness across firms in integrating ESG and other non-financial information.
8
  
 
Our main contribution, therefore, is to investigate the impact of the mandating of IR in South 
Africa on analyst forecast accuracy, using the level of ESG disclosures as a mediating 
variable in identifying any impact.  Secondary contributions of the study are, first, to revisit 
                                                          
6
  They also study analyst forecast dispersion and the cost of capital as capital market outcomes that could be 
affected by IR.  They find some evidence that the degree to which reports are integrated according to their 
measure is associated with reductions in the cost of capital, at least for some firms (those with smaller 
analyst followings).   
7
  Our study also differs from theirs in a number of research design choices.  These differences are arguably 
second-order compared to the differences identified in the main text.    
8
  Other studies of IR and capital market outcomes in South Africa include Barth, Cahan, Chen and Venter 
(2015) and Lee and Yeo (2015).  These papers are discussed in the next section of the paper. 
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the link between ESG disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy and, within this context, 
to introduce a more nuanced view of the quality of CSR disclosures, at least in a South 
African setting.   
       
We use a balanced panel research design as our primary methodology.  The balanced panel 
includes forty-one firms from eight sectors (consumer discretionary; consumer staples; 
communications; energy; financial services; health care; industrials; materials) for the period 
2008 to 2012.
 9
 Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores are used to capture the level of disclosures.   
Controlling for firm and time fixed effects and other control variables, our key result is that 
the relationship between overall ESG disclosure scores and analyst forecast accuracy 
significantly strengthens once the IR regime is introduced. This result is consistent with IR 
providing useful information to analysts and investors in general (there tends to be little or no 
relationship before IR, and a relationship after the introduction of IR).  It is primarily driven 
by the environmental disclosure component of the ESG disclosure score.  There is also some 
evidence of links between the level of governance disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy, 
but the evidence is not as strong as for environmental disclosure levels.  We delve further into 
our results, by splitting up the sample into financial services firms and the firms from the 
other seven sectors grouped together. For financial services firms, we find little evidence of 
relationships between the level of any aspect of ESG disclosure and forecast accuracy, either 
                                                          
9
  We use a small sample by the standards of capital markets research in accounting.  Nonetheless, precedent 
exists for the use of small samples when the question is deemed interesting enough.  For example, Leuz 
and Verrechia (2000) study a sample of 102 German Dax firm-years in considering the impact on measures 
of information asymmetry of German firms switching from German GAAP to some form of international 
accounting standards (US GAAP or IAS). Also, Leuz (2003) uses two small samples, one of 69 and the 
other of 195 German Neue Markt firm-years, to study the relative impacts of US GAAP and IAS on 
measures of information asymmetry.  The research settings used in these two analyses were unique in 
providing a good site to study interesting research questions.  We believe that South Africa provides such a 
unique site for the initial study of the impact of mandating IR, which we regard as a similarly interesting 
research question.  We should also emphasise that our statistical tests have plenty of degrees of freedom 
available.       
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existing in, or changing between, the pre- and post-IR periods.  The results for the firms from 
the other seven sectors grouped together are similar to the results for the whole sample.    
 
The use of firm and time fixed effects is a crucial aspect of our research design in that our 
results largely disappear or, at the least, substantially weaken in the absence of either, or the 
presence of less finely granulated firm effects such as sector fixed effects.  The use of an 
unbalanced panel of 310 firm-years produces similar results to the balanced panel, other than 
that the results also provide evidence that there is a strengthening of the relationships between 
overall ESG, environmental and governance disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy 
for financial services firms as well.   
 
Overall, we find some results consistent with those who support IR, and our theory that the 
level of ESG disclosures is a mediating variable in determining the effectiveness of IR in the 
particular capital market context we study.  This outcome is found despite the lack of clear 
guidance to South African companies concerning the preparation of the early versions of 
integrated reports.  Our results also provide support for the idea that specific aspects of ESG 
performance could be more important than others for some sets of firms in understanding 
future performance.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section provides relevant background, 
prior literature, and the development of our main hypotheses.  Section 3 introduces the 
methodology underlying our tests.  Section 4 provides variable descriptions, data sources, and 
details of our sample.  Section 5 provides the results of our tests.  Section 6 discusses 
additional tests performed to investigate the robustness of our results to changes in the 
research approaches adopted for our main tests.  Finally, Section 7 provides a summary of 
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our paper, the overall conclusions to be drawn from our work, a discussion of its limitations, 
and suggestions for further research.   
 
2 RELEVANT PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Relevant Prior Literature 
 
In this section, for reasons of space, we concentrate on work that is directly relevant to this 
study, as opposed to providing a background of the development of IR and a description of 
previous work on IR.  Two recent papers that provide the necessary background information 
and that review the IR literature, although with different rules for the incorporation of studies 
to be included in the review, are Velte and Stawinoga (2016) and Dumay, Bernardi, Guthrie 
and Demartini (2016).   We focus on papers that relate integrated reporting to capital market 
outcomes. 
 
In this context, two recent papers can be interpreted as investigating the effectiveness of the 
IIRC’s framework for the desirable characteristics of an integrated report in a South African 
context.  Both studies use data from before and after the date of implementation of IR in 
South Africa, and develop measures of the degree of integration of financial statements.   Lee 
et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between the degree of integration and market value, 
with the extent of organisational complexity and the need to raise external financing as 
mediating variables.  Using estimates of Tobin’s Q as a measure of market value, they find 
evidence of a relationship between the degree of integration and market value and that, 
further, the relationship is stronger for firms with higher degrees of organisational complexity 
and with higher external financing needs.  They also find a positive association between the 
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degree of integration and future performance and that the degree of integration could be mis-
priced.   Zhou et al. (forthcoming) study whether the degree to which South African financial 
reports are integrated affects analyst forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and the cost of 
capital.  They find that the higher the degree of integration, the higher is the degree of 
forecast accuracy and the lower is the cost of capital, the latter especially for firms with small 
analyst followings.   Nonetheless, the foci of these studies are neither the impact of the 
mandating of IR in South Africa nor the role of ESG disclosure levels as a mediating variable 
in investigating the impact of mandating IR. 
 
Barth et al. (2015) look at the relationship between IR and stock liquidity and market value in 
South Africa.  They find that IR improves stock liquidity and is associated with higher values 
of Tobin’s Q.  Unlike Lee et al. (2015), they do not use organisational complexity and the 
need for external financing as mediating variables in the relationship between IR and market 
value.  Like them, however, the effect of IR on Tobin’s Q is then attributed mainly to a future 
cash flow effect, as opposed to a cost of capital effect (in apparent contrast to Zhou et al., 
forthcoming, who find cost of capital effects, especially for firms with small analyst 
followings). They suggest that this effect is a result of market participants either having a 
better understanding of the firm’s future cash flow generating capacity or that future cash 
flow expectations are higher as a result of expected improvements in internal decision-
making by managers.  Again, and unlike us, Barth et al. (2015) do not explicitly study the 
level of ESG disclosure (or its components) as mediating variables for the relationship 
between IR and their capital market outcomes. 
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2.2 Development of Hypotheses 
 
Given that IR does not directly affect the properties of accounting numbers, but does 
potentially affect the information set available via which the information content of 
accounting numbers is interpreted, we focus on the properties of analyst forecasts. In 
particular, we argue that, if IR in South Africa provides useful information to investors, by 
linking ESG and future financial performance, analyst forecast accuracy should improve 
subsequent to the start of the IR regime.   
 
Evidence from Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores for South Africa suggests that the quality 
of ESG reporting varies across firms.  A priori, it seems unlikely that IR will provide much 
benefit to users and, specifically, analysts if there is little ESG disclosure to help link ESG 
performance to future financial performance.  Therefore, we argue that IR will improve the 
forecasting relevance of disclosures concerning ESG performance for analysts and, further, 
the higher the disclosure levels of ESG performance, the larger will be the improvement.  
Also, if the arguments of proponents of IR are correct – that, in the absence of IR, ESG 
disclosures will have limited impact on capital markets because the links to financial 
performance are not understood – we expect to observe less of a, or indeed no, relationship 
between ESG disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy prior to the IR regime. 
 
Therefore, our formal hypothesis for the pre-IR regime period, in null and alternative form, is 
as follows: 
 
H1N   Prior to the IR regime, ESG disclosure levels have no association with analyst 
forecast accuracy; and  
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H1A   Prior to the IR regime, increased levels of ESG disclosure improve analyst forecast 
accuracy. 
 
For the IR regime period, our second hypothesis, in null and alternative form, is as follows: 
 
H2N   During the IR regime, ESG disclosure levels have no association with analyst forecast 
accuracy; and  
H2A   During IR regime, increased levels of ESG disclosure improve analyst forecast 
accuracy. 
 
For differences between the pre-and post-IR regime periods, our third, and main, hypothesis, 
in null and alternative form, is as follows: 
 
H3N   There is no difference in the extent to which increasing ESG disclosure levels 
improves analyst forecast accuracy before and after the IR regime; and  
H3A   There is an increase in the extent to which increasing ESG disclosure levels improves 
analyst forecast accuracy after the IR regime. 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
We adopt a regression approach to testing our hypotheses.  Within that general approach, we 
adopt a balanced panel strategy.  We do so for a number of reasons.  Pope et al. (2011) argue 
that the experimental design necessary to pin down the impact of an accounting regime 
change can be difficult because, along with the regime change, firm and economic 
characteristics that might affect some outcome variable (in our case, analyst forecast 
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accuracy) also change over time.  As a consequence, the observation of a change in an 
outcome variable (in our study, the relationship between the level of ESG disclosure and 
analyst forecast accuracy) over time could be associated with the regime change, or changes 
in relevant firm and economic characteristics, or both.  Disentangling the impact of one 
possible cause from the others is, therefore, problematic.     
 
In this context, Pope et al. (2011) suggest that a balanced panel approach has some 
advantages because each firm observation prior to the regime change acts as a control for 
itself.   If it can be assumed that relevant firm characteristics, and their impact on the outcome 
variable, do not change over time, the inclusion of firm fixed effects in the model can control 
for these effects (e.g., how difficult it is to forecast the firm’s earnings per share).  Further, if 
there are time effects that are constant across firms in their impact on the outcome variable, 
they can be controlled for via the introduction of time fixed effects.
10
 
 
We adopt the approach of introducing firm and time fixed effects as a partial solution to 
controlling for the effects of firm and economic characteristics that change over time and 
affect analyst forecast accuracy.  Given the implicit assumptions underlying the use of fixed 
effects, we also control for seven specific variables that have been found to affect analyst 
forecast accuracy in other studies – firm size, the size of analyst following, leverage, return 
on assets, the sign of earnings, the book-to-market ratio, and lagged accuracy (as in, for 
example, Glaum, Baetge, Grothe and Oberdörster, 2013; Preiato, Brown and Tarca, 2015).      
 
We investigate the impact of the introduction of an IR regime in South Africa on forecast 
accuracy by first defining the following variables: 
                                                          
10
  Zhou et al. (forthcoming) find that their measure of the degree of integration of reporting generally 
increases over their sample period from 2009 to 2012.  If their measure is an omitted variable from our 
regressions, time dummies will at least help capture some of the average effects of this variable.  
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Accuracyij+1 = a measure of analyst forecast accuracy for firm i for year j (j = 1 to t, where 
t is the number of calendar years containing financial year-ends in the 
sample); 
Fi = a firm fixed effect which takes the value of one for any firm-year for firm i 
(i = 1 to n, where n is the number of firms in the sample); zero otherwise; 
Tj   = a time fixed effect which takes the value of one for any firm-year with a 
financial year-end in calendar year j; zero otherwise; 
Cikj = control variable k (k = 1 to m) for firm i for year j; and 
ESGij = the overall environmental, social and governance disclosure score for firm i 
for year j;  
 
Then, we estimate the following equation on a balanced panel of South African firms:  
                  
1 1
1 1 1
n t m
ij i j ij k ikj ij
i j k
Accuracy F T ESG C  
  
      
 (1)
 
Subsequently, we create two variables, PreESG and PostESG. The two variables effectively 
decompose ESG into two components. One takes the value of ESG during the period prior to 
the IR regime starting, and zero otherwise (PreESG).  The other takes the value of ESG 
during the period after the IR regime starts, and zero otherwise (PostESG).  Hence, we define 
PreESG and PostESG by the following equations: 
 Pr (1 ).ij ijeESG IRRD ESG   (2) 
and 
                                                    .ij ijPostESG IRRD ESG  (3) 
where: 
 
IRRD = 1 for any firm-year t with a financial year-end subsequent to March 2011; 0 
otherwise. 
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We then estimate the following equation:  
           
1 11 12
1 1 1
Pr
n t m
ij i j ij ij k ikj ij
i j k
Accuracy F T eESG PostESG C   
  
       
 (4)
 
We estimate equation (1) to allow us to see whether there is an average effect on forecast 
accuracy associated with environmental, social and governance disclosure levels across the 
period studied.  This effect is captured by the coefficient of ESG, .  Equation (4) allows us 
to identify the effects before and after the IR regime is introduced.  More specifically,  
captures the relationship between ESG disclosure levels and forecasting accuracy in the 
period prior to the introduction of IR and  captures the relationship between ESG 
disclosure levels and forecasting accuracy in the period subsequent to the introduction of IR.  
The coefficients  and  allow us to test hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively and the 
difference between them allows the testing of hypothesis 3.  
 
Having estimated equations (1) and (4) using ESG, the overall ESG disclosure score, we re-
estimate the equations with the environmental disclosure score (ED), social disclosure score 
(SD) and governance disclosure score (GD) substituted for ESG, together with the 
appropriately defined Pre and Post versions of the variables, in order to see if any particular 
component of ESG disclosure has a different relationship with forecast accuracy than other 
components.  In this regard, we first estimate (giving the most comprehensive models 
estimated):  
                       
3
1 1
1 1 1 1
 
n t m
l
ij i j ilj k ikj ij
i j l k
Accuracy F T ESG C  
   
       
 (5)
 
and then:  
    
3 3
1 11 12
1 1 1 1 1
Pr
n t m
l l
ij i j ilj ilj k ikj ij
i j l l k
Accuracy F T eESG PostESG C   
    
         
 (6)
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where ESGilj represents the l’
th
 component (ED, SD and GD) of the overall ESG disclosure 
score for firm i for year j. 
 
We define analyst forecast accuracy in two ways and denote the measures by Acc1 and Acc2 
respectively.  In mathematical terms, the measures of forecast accuracy are defined as 
follows: 
                                                  
| |
1 log
AEPS MedFEPS
Acc
MVPS
 
  
 
 (7) 
 
and 
                                                  
| |
2 log
| |
AEPS MedFEPS
Acc
AEPS
 
  
 
 (8) 
 
where:  
 
AEPS = the actual earnings per share corresponding to the median consensus one 
year-ahead forecast of earnings per share;  
MedFEPS = the first median consensus analyst forecast of one year-ahead earnings per 
share produced after the financial year-end; and 
MVPS = the market price per share of the firm at the financial year-end prior to the 
date of the consensus analyst forecast. 
 
A property of both our measures of accuracy is that a lower value for the accuracy measures 
denotes a higher degree of forecast accuracy.
11
  Therefore, if increasing ESG disclosure 
                                                          
11
  We use log measures of forecast accuracy to avoid having measures that are naturally truncated at zero, 
leading to possible specification problems for the estimated standard errors in our regressions, and 
attendant difficulties of economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients from our regressions.  
Inherently, the relationship between forecasting accuracy and the various explanatory variables must be 
non-linear.  We posit no particular functional form for the relationship and, hence, taking the log of 
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levels increases forecast accuracy, whether in the whole period or in either of the sub-periods, 
we will see a negative value for 1 or 11  or 12 .When separately considering the 
component scores of ESG disclosure, if increasing ESG component disclosure levels 
increases forecast accuracy, whether in the whole period or in either of the sub-periods, we 
will see a negative value for 1
l or 11
l  or 12
l . If IR has the effect of strengthening any 
relationship between ESG disclosure levels, or its components, and analyst forecast accuracy, 
we expect to see 11 12   or 11 12
l l  . 
 
We estimate the coefficients in equations (1), (4), (5) and (6) using the ‘within’ estimator to 
deal with the firm fixed effects, and estimate coefficient standard errors using firm clustering.  
The p-values that we report for the coefficients of our experimental variables in these 
equations reflect one-tailed tests, because our hypotheses specify a directional alternative 
hypothesis – as implied above, only negative values of the coefficients cause us to reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis.  The same applies to the F-tests of the 
differences between the coefficients of the PreESG (PreED, PreSD, PreGD) and PostESG 
(PostED, PostSD, PostGD) variables - only positive values of these differences cause us to 
reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis.  The p-values for the 
coefficients of all the control variables reflect two-tailed tests.   
 
We should emphasise, at this stage, that any conclusions that we draw from estimating these 
equations and, in particular, the estimates of the coefficients of the various ESG variables, are 
conditional upon accepting that our strategy of controlling for other factors that might affect 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
forecast accuracy is just one way of implementing a non-linear relationship.  As a consequence of taking 
the log of forecast accuracy, for both measures, the numerator of the fraction of which we take the natural 
log can be zero if the consensus forecast is correct.  It is not possible to take the log of zero.  In such 
circumstances, we set the fraction equal to an arbitrary low number.  In our case, the number is .00001.  
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analyst forecast accuracy by a combination of firm and time fixed effects and the seven firm-
specific control variables, adequately rules out alternative explanations of our results.   
 
Nonetheless, we can make one point on this issue here.  Our research design does not rely on 
a simple assertion that the IR regime change has a blanket impact on forecast accuracy, 
leading to some of the ‘identification’ problems discussed above.  Instead, it suggests that the 
IR regime, if successful, alters any relationship between ESG disclosure levels and forecast 
accuracy.  As a consequence, to argue that some omitted variable explains away our results 
relies upon the existence of different correlations between that variable and ESG disclosure 
scores in the pre- and post-IR periods.
12
 
 
Finally, Pope et al. (2011, p.246) argue that the ‘... challenge to researchers is ... to find ways 
of more directly associating market outcomes with ... reporting, for example, by developing 
evidence showing that market outcomes are stronger for benchmark firms where the ... 
reporting regime change has had most impact’.  We would argue that our research design 
responds to the spirit of their challenge in the South African context of IR.  It does so by 
relating the impact of the introduction of the IR regime in South Africa, a regime that intends 
to enhance narrative disclosures relating ESG and financial performance, to the underlying 
level of ESG disclosures.  
 
  
                                                          
12
  There is a possibility that another regulatory change could have occurred at the same time as the 
mandating of IR, the predicted effect of which is similar to that hypothesised for IR.  We can find no 
obvious regulatory change in South Africa that matches this description.  It is the case that the 
Companies Act of 2008, despite being passed in 2009, then entered into a prolonged period of redrafting 
and only came into force (with some exceptions) in May, 2011.  It is not clear why, however, it would act 
to affect analyst forecast accuracy through the medium of ESG disclosures.   
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4 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, DATA SOURCES, AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
We generate our data from three data sources – Bloomberg, IBES and Compustat Global.  
We use Bloomberg for ESG disclosure scores.  Qui, Shaukat and Tharyan (2016) use these 
scores in a recent study of UK environmental and social disclosures, and Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2014) also use them in studying the effects of mandating ESG disclosure in China, 
Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa.  Descriptions of how Bloomberg create the scores can 
be found in both papers. 
 
From IBES, we generate our forecast variables.  In particular, we use the database to generate 
observations on the first median consensus one year-ahead earnings per share forecast 
subsequent to a financial year-end (MedFEPS), the number of analysts used by IBES in 
generating the consensus forecast (NoA – as a proxy for the number of analysts following the 
firm), the actual earnings per share figure subject to the forecast (AEPS), and the price per 
share at the financial year-end prior to the forecast date (MVPS).  We also use IBES to 
identify the number of shares outstanding at the financial year-end, which we multiply by 
MVPS to create the market capitalisation at the financial year-end prior to the forecast date. 
We take the log of this product to create Log MV, our measure of firm size.    
 
We generate accounting variables from Compustat Global.  In particular, we generate data for 
total assets (TA), total liabilities (TL) and net income (NI).  We then generate the following 
control variables: (i) leverage (Lev) as the ratio of TL to TA; (ii) return on assets (RoA) as the 
ratio of NI to TA; (iii) a loss dummy (Loss) equal to one if RoA is negative; zero otherwise; 
and (iv) the book-to-market ratio (BM) as the ratio of the difference between TA and TL to 
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the market value of the firm (estimated using IBES data on the price per share and the 
number of shares outstanding). 
 
From these data sources we then construct a balanced panel for the financial years 2008 to 
2012 (with, as a consequence, consensus analyst forecasts for the years 2009 to 2013), after 
imposing further restrictions.  We start our sample period at 2008 because the number of 
firms with ESG disclosure scores is much lower in 2007 than 2008.
13
  We require firms to: (i) 
have the necessary accounting, ESG, IBES forecast and price data; (ii) have consistent 
financial year-ends for 2008 to 2012;
14
 (iii) have their primary listing on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE);
15 
and (iv) report in South African Rands.      
 
Our final sample consists of 41 firms with 5 years of consecutive observations, giving 205 
firm-year observations.  The number of firms listed on the JSE is much larger than 41.  The 
main reason we lose firm-years is because of a lack of availability of Bloomberg ESG data – 
only 68 firms have available ESG data for the full five years.  We then lose a further nine 
firms which do not have their primary listing on the JSE; another four because of changing 
financial year-ends during the period; and an additional five because they do not report in 
South African Rands.  This leaves us with forty-eight remaining firms, and we lose seven 
more because of missing accounting and/or analyst forecast data. 
 
The firms in our sample cover a wide range of sectors (consumer discretionary; consumer 
staples; communications; energy; financial services; health care; industrials; materials).  
                                                          
13
  Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find 37 South African firms who issue standalone CSR reports at some time 
between 1994 and 2007, with 174 firm-years with reports.  They compare these firm-years with 877 firm-
years that do not feature standalone CSR reports.  Perhaps coincidentally, Bloomberg have ESG scores for 
just 37 firms in 2007. 
14
  This restriction ensures that all forecasts relate to the same length of reporting period.  
15  Firms whose primary listing is not on the JSE are not expected to produce integrated reports (see Solomon 
and Maroun, 2012, p.9, fn.2).   
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Although mining companies are an important part of the South African economy, they do not 
dominate our sample.  Of the 41 firms, six are subsidiaries of non-South African 
multinational firms and one is a subsidiary of another listed South African firm.
 16
  Further, 
many of the firms have their shares traded outside of South Africa, in addition to their main 
listing on the JSE.  Ten of these firms are also traded on the Namibian Stock Exchange. 
Many companies have American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) traded in the US.  Nonetheless, 
only one firm has a Level 2 ADR, implying a need to conform to elements of Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure regulations.  Level 2 ADRs are traded on one of the 
US stock exchanges, but do not allow a firm to raise capital in the US.   The firms with Level 
1 ADRs are traded over-the-counter and do not have to conform to SEC disclosure 
regulations.  Further, many of the ADRs are unsponsored, implying that the firm has not 
deliberately sought to make their shares available for purchase in the US.  One firm has a 
listing on the London Stock Exchange.     
 
Given our sample contains financial services firms, and because it is accepted that ratios 
involving accounting variables are likely to have different characteristics for financial 
services firms relative to those in other sectors, we split Lev, RoA and BM into two 
components, one representing the value of that variable when the firm is a financial services 
firm and zero otherwise (Lev-FS, RoA-FS, BM-FS), the other representing the value of that 
variable when the firm does not belong to the financial services sector and zero otherwise 
(Lev-NFS, RoA-NFS, BM-NFS).  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our variables for 
the two sets of firms.
17
 
  
                                                          
16
  Casual comparisons suggest that the sample contains the larger South African domiciled firms listed on the 
JSE. 
17
  No financial services firms have losses in the financial years ending in 2008-2012.  As a consequence, we 
provide no statistics for that variable for financial services firms.    
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_______________________________
 
Insert Table 1 
_______________________________ 
Table 2 provides details of the correlations between the independent and dependent variables 
for both sets of firms. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 2 
_______________________________ 
The correlations in Table 2 suggest that the two measures of forecast accuracy, Acc1 and 
Acc2, are highly correlated.  The components of ESG are significantly and positively 
correlated, more so for financial services firms, but not to such an extent likely to cause 
multi-collinearity problems if they are included in the same regressions.  Neither ESG, nor its 
components, are significantly correlated at the 5% level with either accuracy measure, other 
than for ESG and Acc2 for financial services firms, where the correlation is negative.  The 
ESG scores, and the component scores, are significantly correlated with a number of the 
control variables, especially for financial services firms. Again, these correlations are not of a 
size likely to cause multi-collinearity problems if the variables are included in the same 
regression.
18
 
 
As a final description of our sample, we look at the way in which ESG scores (and, 
separately, its components: ED, SD, GD) have evolved over time, given the South African 
                                                          
18
  We estimate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables (not including the fixed effect 
dummy variables) for the various versions of equation (1) that we estimate.  The VIFs are all less than 10, 
a conventional benchmark for judging whether there are significant multi-collinearity problems (if VIFs 
are over 10, a significant problem is possible).  When we estimate the various versions of equation (4), 
fairly high correlations exist between the Pre- and Post- variables (higher for GD than for SD than for ED).  
Nonetheless, even in the presence of multi-collinearity, coefficient estimates remain unbiased.  t-tests for 
the significance of individual coefficients might be biased towards not rejecting the null hypothesis, 
however. Hence, these correlations might cause problems with tests of the first and second hypotheses, but 
we do not believe they cause problems with the testing of our main hypothesis, the third hypothesis.        
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mandated requirement for sustainability reporting for financial year-ends ending in 2010 
onwards (Ioannou et al., 2014) and subsequently for integrated reporting for financial year-
ends ending in March 2011 onwards.  We do so because the mechanism via which IR is 
hypothesised to affect forecast accuracy is through ESG (ED, SD, GD). As a consequence, we 
would like to identify, specifically, whether the introduction of IR had any incremental 
impact on ESG (ED, SD, GD).  To this end, we first estimate: 
                                         0 1 2ij ijESG ESRD IRRD        (9) 
where ESRD is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a firm-year observation with a financial year-
end of 2010 onwards, and zero otherwise.  On the assumption that these changes in disclosure 
regimes produce a once-and-for-all effect on ESG disclosure scores, we interpret 1 as the 
impact of the sustainability reporting (ES) regime and 2 as the incremental impact of the IR 
regime relative to the ES regime. 
 
Second, we estimate: 
                                 0 1 2 3
1
m
ij k ikj ij
k
ESG ESRD IRRD C    

      (10) 
(and for ED, SD and GD separately as dependent variables) in which we also include the 
control variables we use in our equations investigating forecast accuracy, alongside regime 
change effects.  We do so: (i) because we wish to investigate the impact of variables, some of 
which partially capture the level of disclosure in other jurisdictions, in order to further check 
on the regime change effects; and (ii) in order to identify the (partial) associations of our 
control variables with the disclosure scores, given we will include them all in our regressions 
where a measure of forecast accuracy is the dependent variable.   
 
The results of estimating equations (9) and (10) are reported in Table 3. 
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_______________________________ 
Insert Table 3 
_______________________________ 
When only ESRD and IRRD are considered, the results suggest that the introduction of the ES 
regime in 2010 has statistically significant and positive impacts on ESG, ED and GD. The 
estimates of the impacts on SD are positive, but only marginally statistically significant at the 
10% level, under these circumstances.  The introduction of the IR regime, however, has no 
statistically significant impacts, at the 5% level, on the levels of disclosure, other than at the 
10% level for GD.  When the control variables are added into the regression, no IRRD 
coefficient is significant at conventional levels, and the coefficients of ESRD reduce in terms 
of statistical significance when the dependent variable is either ED or SD.  As a consequence, 
we can reasonably assume that any impact of IR that we identify in our subsequent analysis is 
a consequence of how IR makes ESG disclosures more relevant to analysts, rather than by 
increasing disclosure levels.
 19, 20
   
 
5 RESULTS 
 
The results of estimating equations (1), (4), (5) and (6) for Acc1 as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 4.  For reasons of space, we do not separately report the results for Acc2, 
because, in most aspects, they are qualitatively similar to those for Acc1.  Instead, we 
comment upon those results when they differ from those for Acc1.  
                                                          
19
  We only report the results of estimating equation (10) when using LAcc1 as the measure of lagged 
accuracy.  The results with respect to the coefficients of IRRD are unchanged if we substitute LAcc2 for 
LAcc1 in the regressions. We also estimate equations (9) and (10) with firm fixed effects added.  Doing so 
produces little qualitative change in our results other than the evidence in favour of a positive impact of the 
introduction of IR on GD is slightly strengthened. 
20
  The result here can be contrasted with the comment in Zhou et al. (forthcoming) that the degree of 
integration, as captured by their measure, increases with the mandating of IR in South Africa. This 
suggests that their measure of the degree of integration is not necessarily fully capturing ESG disclosures, 
which appear to have been more affected by the introduction of mandatory ESG reporting in 2010.   
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_______________________________
 
Insert Table 4 
_______________________________ 
The results can be summarised as follows.  First, in the absence of any IR regime effects 
(equations (1) and (5)), both ESG and ED have a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with forecast accuracy for both measures of accuracy at least at the 5% level of 
significance.  There is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between SD and 
forecast accuracy at conventional levels of significance when Acc1 is the dependent variable.  
SD has a negative and statistically significant relationship with forecast accuracy at the 10% 
level of significance when Acc2 is the dependent variable.  When GD is considered on its 
own, there is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship with forecast accuracy at 
conventional levels of significance.  When ED, SD and GD are entered into the regression 
simultaneously (as in equation (5)), ED has a statistically significant relationship with 
forecast accuracy at the 10% level of significance.  At conventional levels of significance, 
there is no evidence that any of the other ESG disclosure level components have a statistically 
significant relationship with forecast accuracy. 
 
When an IR regime effect is considered (equations (4) and (6)), there is little evidence that 
any of the ESG disclosure scores, whether considered overall, separately as components, or 
simultaneously as components, have any statistically significant relationship at conventional 
levels of significance with forecast accuracy prior to the IR regime, as judged by the ‘Pre’ 
coefficients.  Only the coefficients of PreESG and PreED attain a degree of statistical 
significance, and then only at the 10% level.  As a consequence, there is little evidence to 
cause us to reject the null for our first hypothesis for any of our measures of the level of ESG 
disclosures.   
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PostESG, however, has negative and statistically significant relationships with forecast 
accuracy at the 1% level of significance.  PostED also has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with forecast accuracy at the 1% level of significance when included 
in the regression on its own, and at the 5% level of significance or better when included in the 
regression with the other components of ESG disclosure.  PostSD has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with forecast accuracy at the 5% (10%) level of 
significance when included in the regression equation individually and Acc2 (Acc1) is the 
measure of forecast accuracy.  There is no evidence of a relationship at conventional levels of 
statistical significance when it is included in the regression equation with the other 
components of ESG disclosure.  There is no evidence of a relationship between PostGD and 
forecast accuracy at conventional levels of statistical significance.   
 
Therefore, there appears to be solid evidence to reject the null for the second hypothesis for 
the overall ESG disclosure level and for the level of environmental disclosures.  Also, there is 
some, model specification-dependent, evidence to reject the null hypothesis for social 
disclosure levels.  There is no evidence to reject the null for the level of governance 
disclosure.  
 
We now turn to the differences between the coefficients of the ‘Pre’ and ‘Post’ variables, our 
main concern and the subject of our third hypothesis.  When disclosure levels are considered 
individually, there is strong evidence of a negative and statistically significant change in the 
relationship with forecast accuracy for ESG, ED and GD.  The difference between the 
coefficients of PreSD and PostSD, when these disclosure levels are considered individually, 
difference is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance when 
Acc1 is the accuracy measure.  It is significant at the 10% level when the accuracy measure is 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
28 
 
Acc2.  When the ESG disclosure level components are considered simultaneously, the 
difference between the coefficients of PreED and PostED retains its statistical significance at 
the 1% level.  The differences between the coefficients of PreSD and PostSD, and between 
PreGD and PostGD, are not statistically significant at conventional levels, for either of the 
accuracy measures.  Therefore, we have strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis for our 
third and main hypothesis for overall ESG disclosure levels and for environmental disclosure 
levels, some evidence for governance disclosure levels, and only weak evidence for social 
disclosure levels. 
 
The results for the control variables suggest that Log MV is consistently statistically 
significant across all specifications.  Other than for Log MV, significant coefficients are 
reported, if only for some model specifications, for: (i) lagged analyst forecast accuracy for 
both measures of accuracy; (ii) book-to-market for firms not belonging to the financial 
services sector when Acc1 is the dependent variable; and (iii) leverage for those firms when 
Acc2 is the dependent variable.  For all the other variables, the reported coefficients are not 
statistically significantly different from zero.
21
   
  
Therefore, in summary, we find little evidence that there is a relationship between ESG 
disclosure scores, either overall or in terms of its components, and forecast accuracy prior to 
the start of the IR regime.  Nonetheless, there is strong evidence of a (more) negative 
relationship between ESG and, in particular, the environmental disclosure component of the 
ESG disclosure score and forecast accuracy in the IR regime, with some weaker evidence for 
                                                          
21
  We do not explicitly report the coefficients for the time dummies.  Nonetheless, no particular effects are 
revealed by the pattern of coefficients, with few significant coefficients.  There is no trend in the 
coefficients consistent with the degree of integration in South African financial reports improving with an 
associated improvement in analyst forecast accuracy.  This could be caused by a relative lack of 
improvement over time in their measure for our sample companies and/or the effects of other time-
dependent, omitted variables that cancel out the effects of the degree of integration. 
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governance disclosure levels as well.  Given that we have established above that the 
mandating of IR does not increase ESG disclosure levels, the results are consistent with the 
views of advocates of IR who suggest that IR establishes better links between ESG and 
financial performance, with the implied consequence that forecast accuracy will be higher in 
the IR period the higher is the level of ESG disclosure.   
 
More specifically, the strongest evidence suggests that this result seems to be driven by IR 
establishing better links between, in particular, environmental and financial performance.  If 
the link between environmental disclosure levels and forecast accuracy is driven by the 
business models for the firms in our sample generating an economic link between 
environmental and financial performance, we should stress that no attempt should be made to 
generalise the results of our study to other samples with different distributions of business 
models.  Indeed, we develop this point immediately below.  But, the results do suggest that 
some aspects of ESG disclosure might be more informative than others for some sub-samples 
of firms. 
 
It might be a little difficult to understand, however, why environmental disclosure scores 
should drive the link between ESG disclosure levels and forecast accuracy for all firms in our 
sample if it fundamentally reflects a strong economic link between environmental and 
financial performance.  After all, it would not be clear why such a link should exist for 
financial services firms.  As a consequence, we split our sample between the financial 
services sector and the other sectors combined and re-run our regressions.  We only report the 
results for equations (4) and (6) when using Acc1 as the measure of forecast accuracy (the 
results for Acc2 are qualitatively similar).  The results are reported in Table 5.  
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_______________________________ 
Insert Table 5 
_______________________________ 
Focussing on our third, and main, hypothesis, the results are fairly clear-cut.  For financial 
services firms, there is little robust evidence of any change in the relationship between ESG 
disclosure levels and forecast accuracy.  Nor do the control variables affect forecast accuracy.  
For firms in the other sectors combined, the results are similar to the results for the whole 
sample. This suggests that the firms outside of the financial services sector are driving the 
results for the whole sample.  Specifically, for this sub-sample, the differences between the 
coefficients of PreESG and PostESG, and between PreED and PostED, are negative and 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level of significance, whatever the regression 
specification. A negative and statistically significant difference (at the 5% level) exists 
between the coefficients of PreGD and PostGD, when this aspect of ESG disclosure is 
considered individually.  Overall, however, the sub-sample results suggest that IR is not 
necessarily an important disclosure mechanism for all firms in all sectors, at least for the 
context of this study. 
22, 23
  
 
6 ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
We perform additional tests to identify the robustness of our results to alternative 
specifications and explanations.  First, because of the relatively small number of observations 
in our balanced panel, and despite our preference for the balanced panel research design, we 
                                                          
22
  An anonymous reviewer makes the suggestion to us that the additional regulations surrounding the 
financial services sector reinforce a shareholder focus, which could, at least in part, explain the results we 
get for the financial services sector.   
23
  At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we also re-estimate the standard errors for all our tests using 
the bootstrap methods (we use the standard bootstrap methodology built into STATA).  This methodology 
still uses OLS to estimate the coefficients.  The results are very similar other than there is no reason to 
reject our main hypothesis, the third hypothesis, for governance disclosures.  All the results with respect to 
the overall ESG disclosure level and the environmental disclosure level are qualitatively unchanged.   
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also run our tests on an unbalanced panel of 310 firm-year observations.
24
  This does nothing 
to alter our main conclusion about the introduction of IR in South Africa - the relationship 
between ESG and, more specifically, environmental disclosure levels and analyst forecast 
accuracy strengthens after the introduction of IR.  We find, however, some evidence of a 
relationship between ESG and environmental disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy 
before the IR period.  We also find evidence of a strengthened relationship between ESG, 
environmental and governance disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy following the 
introduction of IR for financial services firms.
 25, 26   
 
We also expand our model specifications to allow for the coefficients of the control variables 
to change between the pre- and post-IR periods.  Such an expansion has little qualitative 
impact on our main results with respect to the impact of IR on the relationship between the 
levels of ESG and environmental disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy.  We then restrict 
our sample to those firms that have at least two, or three, analysts making earnings forecasts, 
in order to guard against the possibility that our results are caused by the idiosyncrasies of 
                                                          
24
  We start from 481 firm-years with Bloomberg ESG data for South African firms. 
25
  In an attempt to rule out the possibility that some unspecified global effect associated with the passage of 
time and coincidental with the pre- and post-IR periods in South Africa has intervened to increase the 
strength of the relationship between ESG disclosure scores and forecast accuracy, we also replicate our 
study using a balanced panel of 211 UK companies on data from the same period and using the same 
sample inclusion criteria, as applicable to a UK sample.  We find no evidence of a significant and negative 
change in the coefficient for any of our measures of disclosure in any of our model specifications between 
the two periods.  Indeed, we find no relationships between ESG disclosure levels and analyst forecast 
errors at all.  We regard these findings as supportive of our interpretation that the South African outcomes 
can be attributed to the mandating of IR. The generic possibility identified above is a particular example of 
an omitted variable problem and one solution to the problem is to adopt what is typically referred to as a 
‘difference-in-differences’ research design.  This is what we have done.  Such a design finds a benchmark 
sample without the effect under investigation (in our case, the mandating of IR) and replicates the study 
research design on the benchmark sample.  If, as in our case, no effect is found for the benchmark sample, 
that strengthens the case that the outcome in the sample of interest can be attributed to a particular cause 
(in our case, the mandating of IR).  Nonetheless, as Pope et al. (2011) argue, such a research design does 
not completely solve the omitted variable problem, essentially because the identification of an effective 
benchmark sample is a non-trivial task.  
26  
Just in case there is anything special about the firms in the balanced panel relative to those that do not have 
full data for each year from 2008 to 2012, we define a dummy variable equal to one if a firm-year in the 
unbalanced panel also belongs to the balanced panel; zero otherwise.  We then substitute the ‘balanced 
panel’ dummy for the firm fixed effects.  This substitution substantially weakens the results, relative to 
using firm fixed effects.  It is not possible to include both firm fixed effects and the ‘balanced panel’ 
dummy in the same regression because of multi-collinearity issues.   
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specific analysts associated with firms with limited analyst followings.  Such restrictions 
again have little impact on our main conclusions.   
 
We add into our regressions proxies for the quality of the integrated report, as in Zhou et al. 
(forthcoming).  We note that they point out that their measure of IR quality is similar to those 
produced by professional accountancy firms in South Africa.  Hence, we use rankings 
produced by Ernst and Young (EY) and available from their website for those firms common 
to our sample and those covered by EY.  We create three dummy variables for firms in the 
post-IR period corresponding to whether a firm’s integrated report is classified as either (i) 
top ten; (ii) excellent; or (iii) good.  Firms not featured in the EY reports, or with a 
classification worse than the three mentioned, together with firm-years in the pre-IR period 
become the base case.  Including these dummy ranking variables does not alter our results. 
 
Finally, we focus on the role of fixed firm and time effects.  First, we investigate different 
forms of fixed effects.  Initially, we use sector fixed effects rather than firm fixed effects.
27
  
We retain time fixed effects.  With this specification, the evidence in favour of the main 
conclusions of our previous analyses is much weaker – specifically, there are no statistically 
relationships between ESG disclosure levels and analyst forecast errors at the 10% level or 
better, either before or after the mandating of IR in South Africa.  When Acc1 is the 
dependent variable, there are, however, statistically significant differences, of the predicted 
sign if only at the 10% level of significance, in the strengths of relationships, before and after 
the mandating of IR, between environmental disclosure levels and analyst forecast errors.  
The significance level is 5% when Acc2 is the dependent variable.
28
   If we substitute IRRD 
                                                          
27
  It is not possible to use both firm and sector fixed effects because of multi-collinearity issues. 
28
  An anonymous reviewer points out that some of the firms are subsidiaries of larger, multinational, firms 
which have more resources to implement IR.  We model this suggestion in two ways.  First, when we 
substitute a ‘subsidiary’ dummy for firm fixed effects, our key results with respect to the third hypothesis 
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for the time fixed effects, retaining firm fixed effects and using the ‘within’ fixed effect 
estimator, we largely return to the results reported in the previous section, but with stronger 
evidence of IR producing a governance disclosure level effect on analyst forecast accuracy.   
 
Second, we investigate the impact of removing the various sets of fixed effects.  We remove 
time fixed effects, whilst maintaining firm fixed effects and using the ‘within’ fixed effect 
estimator. With this specification, we find that both the level of overall ESG disclosures and 
the level of environmental disclosures, but only when the latter is considered on its own, are 
significantly associated with analyst forecast accuracy both before and after the mandating of 
IR.  Additionally, the strength of the relationship does not change between the two periods.  
When ED, SD and GD are considered jointly, the results are similar to our main results.  
When we remove firm fixed effects and retain time effects, or remove both firm and time 
fixed effects, we get little evidence to reject any of our null hypotheses for any of the 
disclosure levels.     
 
Overall, our results are fairly robust to the additional tests we run, other than in one respect.  
First, the presence of firm fixed effects in the modelling substantially strengthens the 
statistical significance of relationships to be observed between ESG disclosure levels, or any 
of its components, and analyst forecast accuracy.  Second, some form of time fixed effects is 
generally needed in the modelling if any change in the relationship between ESG disclosure 
levels and analyst forecast accuracy in the direction predicted is to be observed between pre- 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are unchanged although the results for the first and second hypotheses are much weakened. The 
coefficient of the ‘subsidiary’ dummy is positive, suggesting these firms have lower forecast accuracy, 
ceteris paribus.  This suggests the importance of firm fixed effects, as opposed to more tightly specified 
effects.  We also interact the ‘subsidiary’ dummy with the Post- disclosure measures and add it into our 
regressions.  We find that its coefficients are generally not significant, and do not alter our results, other 
than in one case – when all the different disclosure levels are included in the equation at the same time.  
In these cases, we find that the third hypothesis cannot be rejected for GD for non-subsidiary firms, but 
can be for subsidiary firms.  This applies for both measures of accuracy.  For SD, we get a similar result, 
but only for our first measure of accuracy.  
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and post-IR periods, other than when all the components of ESG disclosure levels are 
considered simultaneously.  Third, relaxing the balanced panel aspect of our research design 
produces evidence of a strengthened relationship between ESG, environmental and 
governance disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy following the introduction of IR 
for both financial services firms and firms from the other sectors represented in our sample. 
 
Given the difficulties in fully specifying a model of analyst forecast accuracy from a 
theoretical perspective, we believe that our use of firm and time fixed effects in the modelling 
is justifiable.  Nonetheless, it is important to stress the crucial role played by including these 
effects in coming to the conclusions that we do about the impact of the mandating of IR in 
South Africa.    
 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We investigate the impact of mandating IR in South Africa on the accuracy of analyst one 
year-ahead forecasts of earnings.  Given that IR is intended to link ESG and financial 
performance, we theorise that, if there is any impact, it will be higher for firms with higher 
ESG disclosure.  Further, if there is a need for the link provided by IR, ESG disclosure levels 
will not be strongly associated with analyst forecast accuracy before IR is implemented, 
whereas they will be once integrated reports are provided.   
 
The results using our main, balanced panel, methodology, with firm and time fixed effects, 
suggest that ESG disclosure levels are not robustly associated with analyst forecast accuracy 
before the IR regime was introduced.  There is evidence, however, that ESG disclosure 
levels, and, in particular, environmental disclosure levels, are associated with forecast 
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accuracy after the introduction of the IR regime.  There is also evidence that the level of 
governance disclosures has a strengthened association with forecast accuracy after the 
introduction of the IR regime, but this association tends to be dominated by the 
environmental disclosure effect.  Nonetheless, we also find that the results described above 
are driven by the firms outside the financial services sector in the sample we study, with no 
robust relationships being found between any of our measures of the level of ESG disclosure 
and forecast accuracy for financial services firms.  The use of firm and time fixed effects as 
an element of our modelling is crucial for generating these results.  Also, if we relax the 
balanced panel aspect of our research design, we find evidence of a strengthened relationship 
between ESG, environmental and governance disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy 
following the introduction of IR for both financial services firms and those from the other 
sectors. 
 
If accepted as valid, these results are consistent with IR having the potential to provide useful 
information on the links between ESG and financial performance (although the potential 
might not be inevitably realised for all sets of firms).  These results complement other recent 
papers, such as Lee et al. (2015), Zhou et al. (forthcoming) and Barth et al. (2015), which 
also suggest that IR can provide useful information to capital markets.  Importantly, the 
results are also consistent with our theory that the usefulness of these links will improve the 
higher is the level of ESG disclosure.  Further, IR in South Africa over the period did not, of 
necessity, have an investor focus because relatively little guidance was on offer as to how 
integrated reports should be prepared.  More recently, however, the IIRC has produced 
guidelines concerning IR recommending an investor focus.  Our results, again if accepted as 
valid, also suggest that an explicit investor focus is not required for IR to be useful to 
investors.   It would appear that any balancing of the interests of different stakeholders by 
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South African firms in producing an integrated report did not produce any undue move away 
from providing information useful to investors.  This evidence can be contrasted with the 
IIRC’s version of IR which specifies an investor focus, a policy that has created academic 
debate (e.g., Adams, 2015; Flower, 2015; Thomson, 2015).   
 
There are limitations to our work.  For example, our control variable strategy could be 
inadequate, leading to an omitted variable problem, leading in turn to biased coefficient 
estimates on our experimental variables and biased conclusions.  This is the ‘identification’ 
problem associated with identifying the effects of accounting and regime changes.  In our 
case, however, to argue that some omitted variable explains away our results relies upon both 
an association of the variable with forecast accuracy and the existence of different 
correlations between that variable and ESG disclosure scores in the pre- and post-IR periods, 
not merely a variable associated with forecast accuracy that changes over the time period of 
the regime change.   
 
Our work suggests future research possibilities.  For example, longer-term analyst forecasts 
could be studied (e.g., two year-ahead earnings per share forecasts) within our framework.  
Given that one of the benefits of IR is argued to be a focus on the future implications of 
various actions and decisions concerning ESG activities for financial performance, studying 
longer-term forecasts makes sense.
29
  Also, following the idea in Zhou et al. (forthcoming), 
as more data is gathered through the passage of time, the impact of firms having differing 
degrees of effectiveness in integrating ESG information into their reports could be studied 
within our research framework, given we only capture average effects associated with the 
mandating of IR.   
                                                          
29
  At the time of collecting the data, only one set of two-year forecasts, along with the associated outcomes, 
is available. 
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TABLE 1 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
PANEL A – FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS – 60 FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS 
 
Variables Min Median Mean Max SD 
Acc1 -3.87 -1.98 -2.15 -0.96 0.60 
Acc2 -2.86 -0.86 -1.02 1.03 0.66 
ESG 10.53 34.87 33.85 63.60 13.33 
ED 0.00 19.65 19.28 49.11 13.56 
SD 0.00 40.00 39.12 88.33 20.74 
GD 42.86 57.14 58.04 76.79 9.44 
Log MV 3.36 4.53 4.53 5.28 0.50 
NoA 1.00 6.00 7.18 16.00 3.96 
LAcc1 -3.61 -1.86 -2.02 -0.96 0.60 
LAcc2 -2.62 -0.79 -0.92 1.03 0.65 
Lev-FS 0.35 0.91 0.82 0.97 0.17 
RoA-FS 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.03 
BM-FS 0.06 0.49 0.46 1.03 0.20 
 
PANEL B – OTHER SECTORS – 145 FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS 
 
Variables Min Median Mean Max SD 
Acc1 -3.87 -1.95 -1.98 -0.68 0.68 
Acc2 -2.86 -0.81 -0.77 1.03 0.73 
ESG 11.98 37.60 37.72 64.11 11.51 
ED 0.00 27.13 27.07 65.29 15.66 
SD 5.26 42.11 42.44 78.95 17.40 
GD 32.14 57.14 56.17 71.43 6.38 
Log MV 3.17 4.32 4.40 5.56 0.56 
NoA 1.00 7.00 7.39 16.00 3.68 
Loss 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.00 0.27 
LAcc1 -3.61 -1.80 -1.91 -0.66 0.69 
 LAcc2 -2.62 -0.70 -0.75 1.03 0.72 
Lev-NFS 0.14 0.53 0.53 1.02 0.19 
RoA-NFS -0.10 0.09 0.11 0.51 0.11 
BM-NFS -0.03 0.36 0.46 3.19 0.44 
 
 
Notes: Acc1 is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings per share and the median consensus 
earnings per share forecast divided by market value per share at the previous financial year end.  Acc2 is the 
absolute value of the difference between actual earnings per share and the median consensus earnings per share 
forecast divided by the absolute value of actual earnings per share.  ESG is the overall Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure score.  ED is the environmental disclosure component score.  SD is the social disclosure component 
score. GD is the governance disclosure component score.  Log MV is the log of the market value of the firm at 
the financial year end prior to the year for which the earnings forecast is made.  NoA is the number of analysts 
forecasts used to create a consensus forecast.  Loss is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm made a loss in the 
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year prior to the earnings forecast; 0 otherwise.  LAcc1 is the one year lag of Acc1.  LAcc2 is the one year lag of 
Acc2.  Lev-FS (Lev-NFS) is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for financial services (other sector) firms; 0 
otherwise. RoA-FS (RoA-NFS) is the ratio of net income to total assets for financial services (other sector) firms; 
0 otherwise.  BM-FS (BM-NFS) is the ratio of book value (total assets less total liabilities) to market value at the 
financial year-end prior to the forecast for financial services (other sector) firms; 0 otherwise.  
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TABLE 2 
 
PEARSON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
 
PANEL A - FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS – 60 FIRM-YEARS 
 
Variables Acc1 Acc2 ESG ED SD GD Log MV NoA Lag Acc1 Lag Acc2 Lev-FS RoA-FS 
Acc2 0.97            
ESG -0.23 -0.26           
ED -0.23 -0.27 0.94          
SD -0.21 -0.24 0.92 0.76         
GD -0.18 -0.18 0.81 0.70 0.68        
Log MV -0.13 -0.16 0.71 0.59 0.69 0.68       
NoA -0.18 -0.25 0.72 0.63 0.73 0.56 0.82      
Lag Acc1 0.20 0.17 -0.25 -0.20 -0.32 -0.09 -0.19 -0.16     
Lag Acc2 0.19 0.16 -0.26 -0.23 -0.32 -0.11 -0.21 -0.20 0.97    
Lev-FS 0.08 0.03 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.24 0.49 0.00 -0.04   
RoA-FS -0.09 -0.06 -0.29 -0.22 -0.31 -0.31 -0.37 -0.54 -0.08 -0.06 -0.74  
BM-FS -0.01 -0.03 0.37 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.50 0.44 0.14 0.09 -0.14 -0.36 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 
PANEL B – OTHER SECTORS – 145 FIRM-YEARS 
 
Variable Acc1 Acc2 ESG ED SD GD Log MV NoA Loss Lag Acc1 Lag Acc2 Lev-NFS RoA-NFS 
Acc2 0.94             
ESG 0.12 0.11            
ED 0.19 0.17 0.92           
SD 0.04 0.03 0.75 0.47          
GD -0.01 -0.03 0.53 0.36 0.39         
Log MV -0.25 -0.17 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05        
NoA -0.18 -0.13 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.70       
Loss 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.14 0.10      
Lag Acc1 0.34 0.30 0.15 0.23 0.03 0.00 -0.32 -0.23 0.34     
Lag Acc2 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.05 -0.26 -0.15 0.39 0.93    
LeV-NFS -0.12 -0.15 -0.26 -0.27 -0.18 -0.10 -0.27 0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.04   
RoA-NFS -0.15 -0.18 0.06 -0.02 0.21 -0.11 0.36 0.06 -0.40 -0.26 -0.38 -0.34  
BM-NFS 0.42 0.39 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.16 -0.50 -0.35 0.13 0.38 0.39 -0.23 -0.41 
 
 
Notes: See the notes to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
 
DETERMINANTS OF ESG SCORES AND ITS COMPONENTS 
 
Variables Dependent Variable 
 
ESG ED SD GD 
ESRD 5.49** 4.76** 5.90** 5.05* 5.65* 4.59 4.10*** 4.17*** 
p-value (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
IRRD 1.63 0.34 1.44 0.26 1.63 -0.59 2.26* 1.67 
p-value (0.46) (0.86) (0.62) (0.92) (0.63) (0.84) (0.08) (0.14) 
Log MV  1.07  2.60  -2.90  2.98* 
p-value 
 
(0.63)  (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.10) 
NoA 
 
1.28***  1.23***  2.31***  0.19 
p-value 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.39) 
Loss 
 
3.88  0.85  12.71**  0.97 
p-value 
 
(0.37)  (0.88)  (0.02)  (0.59) 
Lev-FS 
 
2.05  -5.70  13.27  4.48 
p-value 
 
(0.74)  (0.39)  (0.19)  (0.29) 
Lev-NFS 
 
-0.09  -7.68  9.39  5.88 
p-value 
 
(0.99)  (0.32)  (0.29)  (0.12) 
RoA-FS 
 
-10.82  -23.47  30.56  -26.61 
p-value 
 
(0.82)  (0.73)  (0.61)  (0.32) 
RoA-NFS 
 
32.52***  15.79  88.47***  5.77 
p-value 
 
(0.00)  (0.21)  (0.00)  (0.40) 
BM-FS 
 
10.24  2.91  23.44*  11.50** 
p-value 
 
(0.21)  (0.70)  (0.09)  (0.04) 
BM-NFS 
 
11.88***  11.38***  20.25***  5.49*** 
p-value 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
LAcc1 
 
1.37  3.89**  -1.76  0.32 
p-value 
 
(0.32)  (0.03)  (0.41)  (0.69) 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.06 0.31 0.04 0.24 0.02 0.31 0.14 0.28 
 
 
Notes: The regressions are estimated using OLS for the coefficient estimates.  The significance levels reported 
are based upon heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  ESRD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
financial year-end falls in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012; 0 otherwise. IRRD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm financial year-end falls after February 2011; 0 otherwise. See the notes to Table 1 for other variable 
definitions.
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TABLE 4 
 
THE IMPACT OF ESG SCORES AND THE INTEGRATED REPORTING REGIME ON ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY (205 FIRM-YEARS) 
 
Dependent Variable is Acc1 
 
PANEL A - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS – ESG VARIABLES 
 
ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD 
 
Eqn (1) Eqn (4) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) 
ESG -0.02**          
(p-value) (0.01)          
ED   -0.01**      -0.01*  
(p-value)   (0.01)      (0.07)  
SD     -0.01    -0.00  
(p-value)     (0.10)    (0.26)  
GD       -0.00  0.00  
(p-value)       (0.32)  (0.50)  
PANEL B - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS – PRE-IR PERIOD ESG VARIABLES 
PreESG  -0.01*         
(p-value)  (0.06)         
PreED    -0.01*      -0.01 
(p-value)    (0.10)      (0.26) 
PreSD      -0.01    -0.01 
(p-value)      (0.17)    (0.21) 
PreGD        0.00  0.00 
(p-value)        (0.52)  (0.59) 
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
PANEL C - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS – POST-IR PERIOD ESG VARIABLES 
 
ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD 
 
Eqn (1) Eqn (4) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) 
PostESG  -0.03***         
(p-value)  (0.00)         
PostED    -0.02***      -0.02** 
(p-value)    (0.00)      (0.01) 
PostSD      -0.01*    -0.00 
(p-value)      (0.08)    (0.37) 
PostGD        -0.01  -0.00 
(p-value)        (0.14)  (0.35) 
PANEL D - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS – CONTROL VARIABLES 
Log MV -1.27** -1.66*** -1.26** -1.64*** -1.31** -1.47*** -1.30** -1.47*** -1.27** -1.64*** 
(p-value) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
NoA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(p-value) (0.88) (0.77) (0.93) (0.84) (0.82) (0.78) (0.84) (0.80) (0.90) (0.82) 
Loss 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02 
(p-value) (0.89) (0.89) (1.00) (0.79) (0.84) (0.76) (0.98) (0.95) (0.89) (0.89) 
LAcc1 -0.17* -0.21** -0.17* -0.19** -0.17* -0.19** -0.16 -0.19** -0.17* -0.20** 
(p-value) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) 
Lev-FS 1.49 1.82 1.65 2.10 0.95 1.03 0.65 0.72 1.67 2.00 
(p-value) (0.58) (0.50) (0.52) (0.42) (0.74) (0.73) (0.82) (0.80) (0.52) (0.46) 
Lev-NFS -1.83 -2.00 -1.83 -2.18* -1.49 -1.46 -1.36 -1.34 -1.85 -2.15* 
(p-value) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.12) (0.08) 
RoA-FS -2.18 0.31 -2.14 0.29 -2.63 -1.89 -4.01 -2.68 -1.73 0.63 
(p-value) (0.77) (0.97) (0.78) (0.97) (0.72) (0.80) (0.59) (0.72) (0.82) (0.93) 
RoA-NFS 0.09 0.40 0.07 0.23 0.51 0.67 0.46 0.70 0.12 0.33 
(p-value) (0.92) (0.67) (0.94) (0.82) (0.57) (0.47) (0.61) (0.43) (0.90) (0.75) 
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
 
ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD 
 
Eqn (1) Eqn (4) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) Eqn (5) Eqn (6) 
BM-FS -1.80 -1.78 -1.62 -1.61 -2.04 -1.99 -1.86 -1.93 -1.77 -1.84 
(p-value) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) 
BM-NFS 0.68** 0.63** 0.66** 0.59** 0.62* 0.61* 0.58 0.54 0.67** 0.59* 
(p-value) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) 
PANEL E - F-STATISTICS FOR TESTS OF THE EQUALITY OF PRE-IR AND POST-IR ESG COEFFICIENTS 
PreESG = PostESG 
 
7.20*** 
        
PreED = PostED 
   
9.83*** 
     
7.59*** 
PreSD = PostSD 
     
1.04 
   
0.36 
PreGD = PostGD 
       
6.63*** 
 
1.41 
PANEL F - EXPLANATORY POWER 
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 
 
 
Notes: The regressions include firm and time fixed effects and are estimated using OLS for the coefficient estimates.  The significance levels reported are based upon heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard errors.  PreESG (PostESG) equals ESG for the period prior to (after the) introduction of the IR regime; 0 otherwise.  PreED (PostED) equals ED for the period prior to (after 
the) introduction of the IR regime; 0 otherwise.  PreSD (PostSD) equals SD for the period prior to (after the) introduction of the IR regime; 0 otherwise.  PreGD (PostGD) equals GD for the 
period prior to (after the) introduction of the IR regime; 0 otherwise.  See the notes to Table 1 for other variable definitions.  ***, **, * denotes significance using a one-tailed test at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively for the experimental variables and F-statistics, two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 
 
THE IMPACT OF ESG SCORES AND THE INTEGRATED REPORTING REGIME ON ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY – SUB-SAMPLE ANALYSIS 
 
Dependent Variable is Acc1 
 
 Financial Services (60 Firm-Years)  Other Sectors (145 Firm-Years)  
PANEL A - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE PRE-IR ESG VARIABLES 
 
ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD 
 
Eqn (4) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (4) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) 
PreESG -0.02     -0.01*     
(p-value) (0.15)     (0.09)     
PreED  -0.01   0.01  -0.01   -0.01 
(p-value)  (0.22)   (0.62)  (0.11)   (0.24) 
PreSD   -0.00  -0.01   -0.01  -0.00 
(p-value)   (0.44)  (0.22)   (0.13)  (0.32) 
PreGD    -0.02 -0.02    0.00 0.01 
(p-value)    (0.23) (0.27)    (0.65) (0.66) 
PANEL B - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE POST-IR ESG VARIABLES 
PostESG -0.04*     -0.03***     
(p-value) (0.09)     (0.00)     
PostED  -0.03**   -0.02*  -0.02***   -0.02** 
(p-value)  (0.04)   (0.07)  (0.00)   (0.04) 
PostSD   -0.00  0.00   -0.01*  -0.00 
(p-value)   (0.37)  (0.66)   (0.09)  (0.44) 
PostGD    -0.03 -0.03    -0.01 0.00 
(p-value)    (0.12) (0.14)    (0.32) (0.53) 
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TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
PANEL C - REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD ESG ED SD GD ED, SD and GD 
 
Eqn (4) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (4) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) Eqn (6) 
Log MV -1.05 -0.91 -0.50 -0.88 -1.00 -1.99*** -2.04*** -1.87*** -1.83*** -2.00*** 
(p-value) (0.33) (0.34) (0.61) (0.36) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
NoA -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(p-value) (0.50) (0.53) (0.62) (0.42) (0.41) (0.74) (0.76) (0.72) (0.72) (0.76) 
Loss      0.06 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.02 
(p-value)      (0.65) (0.92) (0.55) (0.67) (0.90) 
LAcc1 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.22** -0.21* -0.21* -0.22** -0.22* 
(p-value) (0.20) (0.30) (0.66) (0.70) (0.34) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Lev 3.71 3.73 2.12 2.43 3.15 -1.54 -1.76 -1.12 -0.88 -1.70 
(p-value) (0.24) (0.21) (0.47) (0.40) (0.30) (0.19) (0.14) (0.33) (0.41) (0.13) 
RoA 11.18 11.07 8.07 7.93 9.14 0.93 0.78 1.19 1.31 0.89 
(p-value) (0.32) (0.34) (0.49) (0.45) (0.42) (0.34) (0.46) (0.22) (0.16) (0.44) 
BM -1.66 -1.33 -1.48 -1.92 -2.40 0.48 0.43 0.45 0.40 0.43 
(p-value) (0.36) (0.37) (0.41) (0.30) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) 
PANEL D - F-STATISTICS FOR TESTS OF THE EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS 
PreESG = PostESG 1.12     5.18**     
PreED = PostED  0.94   1.43  9.02***   5.56** 
PreSD = PostSD   0.14  1.24   0.24  0.12 
PreGD = PostGD    2.13* 1.13    4.85** 0.40 
PANEL E – EXPLANATORY POWER 
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.25 
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Notes: The regressions include firm and time fixed effects and are estimated using OLS for the coefficient estimates.  The significance levels reported are based upon heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard errors.  See the notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.  See the notes to Table 1 and 4 for variable definitions.  ***, **, * denotes significance using a one-tailed test at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively for the experimental variables and F-statistics, two-tailed test otherwise. 
